Add to ORKGIn this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction
AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necess...
This thesis is a detailed investigation of a web of philosophical problems surrounding what I call K...
Donnellan (1977) argues for a radical limitation of Kripke’s (1980) thesis concerning the possibilit...
In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that eme...
In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that eme...
The thesis that the necessary and the a pr ior/are extensionally equivalent consists of two independ...
Can some contingent truths be known a priori?: when this question is raised in modern philosophy — a...
In this paper, I argue against the view there are contingent a priori truths, and against the relate...
My primary goal in this paper is to defend the plausibility of Kripke’s (Naming and necessity, Harva...
This paper uses a revized version of some of the arguments from my paper "The Contingent A Priori: M...
After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke'...
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily...
In 'Reference and Contingency', Monist 62 (1979) pp. 161-89, Gareth Evans tried to explain how a pri...
The idea that the epistemology of modality is in some sense a priori is a popular one, but it has tu...
I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity (1980...
AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necess...
This thesis is a detailed investigation of a web of philosophical problems surrounding what I call K...
Donnellan (1977) argues for a radical limitation of Kripke’s (1980) thesis concerning the possibilit...
In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that eme...
In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that eme...
The thesis that the necessary and the a pr ior/are extensionally equivalent consists of two independ...
Can some contingent truths be known a priori?: when this question is raised in modern philosophy — a...
In this paper, I argue against the view there are contingent a priori truths, and against the relate...
My primary goal in this paper is to defend the plausibility of Kripke’s (Naming and necessity, Harva...
This paper uses a revized version of some of the arguments from my paper "The Contingent A Priori: M...
After a brief review of the notions of necessity and a priority, this paper scrutinizes Kripke'...
I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily...
In 'Reference and Contingency', Monist 62 (1979) pp. 161-89, Gareth Evans tried to explain how a pri...
The idea that the epistemology of modality is in some sense a priori is a popular one, but it has tu...
I undertake a metaphysical investigation of Saul Kripke's modern classic, Naming and Necessity (1980...
AbstractBy the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necess...
This thesis is a detailed investigation of a web of philosophical problems surrounding what I call K...
Donnellan (1977) argues for a radical limitation of Kripke’s (1980) thesis concerning the possibilit...