A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperation norms in dilemmas. Kamei [2014, Economics Letters 124, pp.199-202] provides experimental evidence on the prevalence of heterogeneous conditional punishment types by conducting an experiment with a strategy method in the United States. This note reports a replication experiment using subjects in England. As consistent with Kamei (2014), the experiment indicates that people's punishment decisions are on average positively proportional to the others' punishment toward the target. However, it also indicates interesting cross-country differences in the distribution of human conditional punishment types
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third ...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishmen...
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishmen...
This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. T...
Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in dilemma situ...
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are...
Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punis...
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experimen...
Past research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when the...
One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ by gr...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments w...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third ...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishmen...
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishmen...
This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. T...
Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in dilemma situ...
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are...
Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punis...
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experimen...
Past research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when the...
One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ by gr...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments w...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third ...