We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishment decisions to an individual are on average significantly positively proportional to other members’ punishment decisions to that individual
Peter Bußwolder, Swetlana Dregert and Peter Letmathe analyze fair and unfair job promotions using a ...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third ...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishmen...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are...
Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punis...
This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. T...
Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in dilemma situ...
Past research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when the...
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experimen...
One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ by gr...
Recent developments in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that many people display oth...
Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments w...
Peter Bußwolder, Swetlana Dregert and Peter Letmathe analyze fair and unfair job promotions using a ...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third ...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
We elicit human conditional punishment types by conducting experiments. We find that their punishmen...
A large body of literature has shown that peer-to-peer punishment is effective in enforcing cooperat...
The expectation that non-cooperators will be punished can help to sustain cooperation, but there are...
Do opportunities to punish non-punishers help to stabilize cooperation? Or do opportunities to punis...
This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. T...
Both peer-to-peer punishments and rewards can be effective in increasing cooperation in dilemma situ...
Past research has shown that people often take punitive actions towards norm violators even when the...
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experimen...
One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ by gr...
Recent developments in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that many people display oth...
Over-punishment often occurs in anonymous peer-to-peer punishment in public goods game experiments w...
Peter Bußwolder, Swetlana Dregert and Peter Letmathe analyze fair and unfair job promotions using a ...
Assuming rationality of profit maximising agents, various economic models made specific and testable...
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third ...
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