AbstractA three-way arms race can be modeled as an iterated game with the payoff determined by the average performance over the past. We show that there exists a robust strategy for any one player which cannot be exploited by the other players, but for which mutual disarmament is a global attractor if the strategy is used by all three players
Lanchester (1916) modeled combat situations between two opponents, where mutual attrition occurs con...
AbstractA two-on-one combat game is a dynamic encounter in which there are three participants. Each ...
We report an experiment that uses the strategy method (Selten 1967) to elicit subjects' general stra...
AbstractA three-way arms race can be modeled as an iterated game with the payoff determined by the a...
The problem of modeling and "optimally controlling" an arms race situation between two nations is a ...
Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each p...
We consider an “arms race ” game, where two players simultaneously decide whether or not to aquire n...
This article is an attempt to combine two ways of modeling arms races. There is no doubt that the cl...
I investigate a two-country non cooperative game where the status quo ante is asymmetric as one coun...
Three models are presented in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but eith...
This paper develops a decision/game-theoretic model of arms growth which implies that arms competiti...
Much recent work in the AI community concerns algorithms for computing optimal mixed strategies to c...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66968/2/10.1177_002200276400800104.pd
This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential band...
In this paper an N-pursuer vs. M-evader team conflict is studied. The differential game of border de...
Lanchester (1916) modeled combat situations between two opponents, where mutual attrition occurs con...
AbstractA two-on-one combat game is a dynamic encounter in which there are three participants. Each ...
We report an experiment that uses the strategy method (Selten 1967) to elicit subjects' general stra...
AbstractA three-way arms race can be modeled as an iterated game with the payoff determined by the a...
The problem of modeling and "optimally controlling" an arms race situation between two nations is a ...
Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each p...
We consider an “arms race ” game, where two players simultaneously decide whether or not to aquire n...
This article is an attempt to combine two ways of modeling arms races. There is no doubt that the cl...
I investigate a two-country non cooperative game where the status quo ante is asymmetric as one coun...
Three models are presented in which two players agree to share power in a particular ratio, but eith...
This paper develops a decision/game-theoretic model of arms growth which implies that arms competiti...
Much recent work in the AI community concerns algorithms for computing optimal mixed strategies to c...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66968/2/10.1177_002200276400800104.pd
This paper analyzes a two-player game of strategic experimentation with three-armed exponential band...
In this paper an N-pursuer vs. M-evader team conflict is studied. The differential game of border de...
Lanchester (1916) modeled combat situations between two opponents, where mutual attrition occurs con...
AbstractA two-on-one combat game is a dynamic encounter in which there are three participants. Each ...
We report an experiment that uses the strategy method (Selten 1967) to elicit subjects' general stra...
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