AbstractIn this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems by introducing notions of approximate confinement based on various process equivalences. We re-cast the operational semantics classically expressed via probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operators and we present a technique for defining approximate semantics as probabilistic abstract interpretations of the PTS semantics. An operator norm is then used to quantify this approximation. This provides a quantitative measure ɛ of the indistinguishability of two processes and therefore of their confinement. In this security setting a statistical interpretation is then given of the quantity ɛ which relates it to the nu...
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protoc...
AbstractWhen modelling a complex system, such as one with distributed functionality, we need to choo...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
AbstractIn this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilisti...
n this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems...
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic proces...
AbstractWe advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilisti...
AbstractWe prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocols....
We introduce a characterisation of probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operato...
AbstractSecret or private information may be leaked to an external attacker through the timing behav...
AbstractWe consider the specification and testing of systems where probabilistic information is not ...
AbstractWe describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the purpose of anal...
We develop a model of Parametric Probabilistic Transition Systems. In this model probabilities assoc...
AbstractWe show how to formulate and analyse some security notions in the context of declarative pro...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protoc...
AbstractWhen modelling a complex system, such as one with distributed functionality, we need to choo...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
AbstractIn this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilisti...
n this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems...
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic proces...
AbstractWe advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilisti...
AbstractWe prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocols....
We introduce a characterisation of probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operato...
AbstractSecret or private information may be leaked to an external attacker through the timing behav...
AbstractWe consider the specification and testing of systems where probabilistic information is not ...
AbstractWe describe properties of a process calculus that has been developed for the purpose of anal...
We develop a model of Parametric Probabilistic Transition Systems. In this model probabilities assoc...
AbstractWe show how to formulate and analyse some security notions in the context of declarative pro...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protoc...
AbstractWhen modelling a complex system, such as one with distributed functionality, we need to choo...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...