AbstractIn this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems by introducing notions of approximate confinement based on various process equivalences. We re-cast the operational semantics classically expressed via probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operators and we present a technique for defining approximate semantics as probabilistic abstract interpretations of the PTS semantics. An operator norm is then used to quantify this approximation. This provides a quantitative measure ɛ of the indistinguishability of two processes and therefore of their confinement. In this security setting a statistical interpretation is then given of the quantity ɛ which relates it to the nu...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
We develop a model of Parametric Probabilistic Transition Systems. In this model probabilities assoc...
We set out a logic for reasoning about multilevel security of probabilistic systems. This logic incl...
n this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems...
AbstractIn this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilisti...
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic proces...
We introduce a characterisation of probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operato...
We are concerned to give certain guarantees about the security of a system. We identify two kinds of...
AbstractWe show how to formulate and analyse some security notions in the context of declarative pro...
We are concerned to give certain guarantees about the security of a system. We identify two kinds of...
In this paper we propose a basic framework to merge security controllers with probabilistic concepts...
AbstractWe advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilisti...
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protoc...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
We develop a model of Parametric Probabilistic Transition Systems. In this model probabilities assoc...
We set out a logic for reasoning about multilevel security of probabilistic systems. This logic incl...
n this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilistic systems...
AbstractIn this paper we lay the semantic basis for a quantitative security analysis of probabilisti...
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic proces...
We introduce a characterisation of probabilistic transition systems (PTS) in terms of linear operato...
We are concerned to give certain guarantees about the security of a system. We identify two kinds of...
AbstractWe show how to formulate and analyse some security notions in the context of declarative pro...
We are concerned to give certain guarantees about the security of a system. We identify two kinds of...
In this paper we propose a basic framework to merge security controllers with probabilistic concepts...
AbstractWe advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilisti...
We advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protoc...
Abstract. We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analysing security protocol...
We develop a model of Parametric Probabilistic Transition Systems. In this model probabilities assoc...
We set out a logic for reasoning about multilevel security of probabilistic systems. This logic incl...