We study collective search processes in, which members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision. When proposals vary along a single dimension, the accpetance set is small, and at most two members determine the outcome whatever the majority rule. When proposals vary along many dimensions, the acceptance set is large except under unaminity and all members affect the distribution of decisions. Various implications are drawn
In organizational groups, often a majority has aligned preferences that oppose those of a minority. ...
We study a model in which a group of agents make a sequence of collective decisions on whether to re...
International audienceAbstractThis paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain o...
We study collective search processes in, which members of a committee decide whether to accept the c...
We study a collective search process in which tentative proposals arrive sequen-tially and members o...
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary pro...
We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different major-ity requirements on bargaining ...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the "secretary pro...
We study a collective decision-making process in which people interested in an issue may participate...
Abstract When sharing a common goal, confident and competent members are often motivated to contribu...
In organizational groups, often a majority has aligned preferences that oppose those of a minority. ...
Majority rule is, generally speaking, not an optimal decision-making process. Impor-tant among its a...
This paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation...
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At ea...
In organizational groups, often a majority has aligned preferences that oppose those of a minority. ...
We study a model in which a group of agents make a sequence of collective decisions on whether to re...
International audienceAbstractThis paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain o...
We study collective search processes in, which members of a committee decide whether to accept the c...
We study a collective search process in which tentative proposals arrive sequen-tially and members o...
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary pro...
We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different major-ity requirements on bargaining ...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the "secretary pro...
We study a collective decision-making process in which people interested in an issue may participate...
Abstract When sharing a common goal, confident and competent members are often motivated to contribu...
In organizational groups, often a majority has aligned preferences that oppose those of a minority. ...
Majority rule is, generally speaking, not an optimal decision-making process. Impor-tant among its a...
This paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation...
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At ea...
In organizational groups, often a majority has aligned preferences that oppose those of a minority. ...
We study a model in which a group of agents make a sequence of collective decisions on whether to re...
International audienceAbstractThis paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain o...