Majority rule is, generally speaking, not an optimal decision-making process. Impor-tant among its advantages is the element of participation. Everyone who wishes votes and in close situations the switching of a single vote may reverse the outcome. Also the winning proposal (if there is one) has the advantage that shifting from it to another alternative will cause dissatisfaction among more people than it will please. On the other hand, majority rule suffers from lack of consideration of intensity of desire among the voters. If some measure of interpersonal satisfaction is hypothesized, a shift away from the winning proposal may well in
The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple c...
Using the voting procedure proposed by Baron (1996), the consequences are examined of changing the m...
In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority ...
A club's majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to rep...
CNRS 2 ; AERES AInternational audienceThe main criticism to the aggregation of individual preference...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
"Majority Judgment" is an evaluative voting rule that picks a candidate with the best median evaluat...
We consider a superior decision rule for making collective choices. In our framework the optimal dec...
A "majority rule" defines the number of club-members that must approve a policy proposed to replace ...
Many electoral rules require a super-majority vote to change the status quo. Without some restrictio...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
This article provides a survey of existing studies of majority rule, outlines misconceptions of majo...
Abstract When sharing a common goal, confident and competent members are often motivated to contribu...
One way of making decisions is for political associates or their representatives to vote on each iss...
The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple c...
Using the voting procedure proposed by Baron (1996), the consequences are examined of changing the m...
In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority ...
A club's majority rule defines the number of members that must approve a policy proposed to rep...
CNRS 2 ; AERES AInternational audienceThe main criticism to the aggregation of individual preference...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
"Majority Judgment" is an evaluative voting rule that picks a candidate with the best median evaluat...
We consider a superior decision rule for making collective choices. In our framework the optimal dec...
A "majority rule" defines the number of club-members that must approve a policy proposed to replace ...
Many electoral rules require a super-majority vote to change the status quo. Without some restrictio...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
This article provides a survey of existing studies of majority rule, outlines misconceptions of majo...
Abstract When sharing a common goal, confident and competent members are often motivated to contribu...
One way of making decisions is for political associates or their representatives to vote on each iss...
The (relative) majority rule is a benchmark collective decision norm. This paper provides a simple c...
Using the voting procedure proposed by Baron (1996), the consequences are examined of changing the m...
In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority ...