Add to ORKGWe consider situations in which agents are notable to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions of such a domain of preferences under which majority rule is quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winner sexist for any set of alternatives. Finally, we compare our proposed restrictions with others in the literature, to conclude that they are independent of any previously discussed domain restriction.Quasi-Transitivity ; Majority Rule
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic...
International audienceWe study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alt...
We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternativ...
We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive ...
A common criticism to simple majority voting rule is the slight support that such rule demands to de...
A social choice rule g selects a member of a given set of alternative X as a function of individual ...
We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets ...
This paper identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the majority ru...
We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed ...
We study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alternatives. We show tha...
We define generalized (preference) domains as subsets of the hypercube {-1,1} (D) , where each of th...
We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majo...
A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule violates the majori...
Axioms of monotonicity, efficiency and continuity are shown to characterize the relative majority ru...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic...
International audienceWe study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alt...
We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternativ...
We present a new domain of preferences under which the majority relation is always quasi-transitive ...
A common criticism to simple majority voting rule is the slight support that such rule demands to de...
A social choice rule g selects a member of a given set of alternative X as a function of individual ...
We characterize sets of alternatives which are Condorcet winners according to preferences over sets ...
This paper identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the majority ru...
We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed ...
We study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alternatives. We show tha...
We define generalized (preference) domains as subsets of the hypercube {-1,1} (D) , where each of th...
We characterize the positional social preference correspondences (spc) satisfying the qualified majo...
A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule violates the majori...
Axioms of monotonicity, efficiency and continuity are shown to characterize the relative majority ru...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic...
International audienceWe study absolute qualified majority rules in a setting with more than two alt...