We show that simple majority rule satisfies the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, and (generic) transitivity on a bigger class of preference domains than any other voting rule. If we replace neutrality in the above list of properties with independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the corresponding conclusion holds for unanimity rule (rule by consensus).Mathematic
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We fir...
In this paper, we contrast direct and representative democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals h...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies four standard and attractive properties—the Pareto prope...
We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that all unanimous decisio...
This paper identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the majority ru...
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities:...
The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are ...
This paper identifies necessary and sufficient single-profile conditions for consistent decision und...
Consider a group of agents whose goal is to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto impr...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We fir...
In this paper, we contrast direct and representative democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals h...
We show that simple majority rule satisfies four standard and attractive properties—the Pareto prope...
We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that all unanimous decisio...
This paper identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the majority ru...
We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities:...
The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are ...
This paper identifies necessary and sufficient single-profile conditions for consistent decision und...
Consider a group of agents whose goal is to reform the status quo if and only if this is Pareto impr...
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions ...
The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and of Condorcet consistency—is...
The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the p...
We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in singleton-valued social choice. We fir...
In this paper, we contrast direct and representative democracy. In a direct democracy, individuals h...
DOI
Add to ORKG