I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases: Auction, VCG mechnism, Ex-post equilibrium, Efficiency., JEL Classification Numbers: D44.,
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and mu...
We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, bu...
We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a ...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have inte...
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equ...
We construct a continuum of inefficient, asymmetric equilibria of symmetric, independent, private-va...
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may...
In many policy contexts, efficiency is the primary consideration in structuring auctions. In this pa...
We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independ...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
This paper constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex pos...
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may...
We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private val...
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and mu...
We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, bu...
We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a ...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have inte...
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equ...
We construct a continuum of inefficient, asymmetric equilibria of symmetric, independent, private-va...
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may...
In many policy contexts, efficiency is the primary consideration in structuring auctions. In this pa...
We consider large double auctions with private values. Values need be neither symmetric nor independ...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
This paper constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex pos...
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may...
We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private val...
We study a double auction environment where buyers and sellers have interdependent valuations and mu...
We consider dynamic auction mechanisms for the allocation of multiple items. Items are identical, bu...
We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a ...
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