Add to ORKGAbstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results. 1
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. ...
We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constrai...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may...
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have inte...
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have inte...
Abstract. We introduce a comparative-statics observation; we prove that the English auction is effic...
Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equa-tions induce changes in its solutions. ...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...
Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. F...
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equ...
I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a contin...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
The English auction is usually modeled as an open continuously ascending price auction in which bidd...
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. ...
We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constrai...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may...
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have inte...
We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have inte...
Abstract. We introduce a comparative-statics observation; we prove that the English auction is effic...
Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equa-tions induce changes in its solutions. ...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...
Changes in the parameters of an n-dimensional system of equations induce changes in its solutions. F...
I introduce a property of player's valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post efficient equ...
I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a contin...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
We establish conditions under which an English auction for an indivisible risky asset has an efficie...
The English auction is usually modeled as an open continuously ascending price auction in which bidd...
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. ...
We design a Generalized Position Auction for players with private values and private budget constrai...
I introduce a property of players valuations that ensures the existence of an ex post e ¢ cient equi...