In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton¿s Principle of Inferential Justification does not have the sceptical consequences that Fumerton sees into it. We think Hookway is right in holding this. However, after commenting on his main considerations for this thesis, we shall develop an independent line of argument which reinforces the same conclusion
Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-86)In this thesis, I examine the structure of epistemic j...
In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified bel...
The “problem of memory” in epistemology is concerned with whether and how we could have knowledge, o...
There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude like: The Principle of Inferential Just...
I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it...
According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say...
Reliability theories of epistemic justification face three main objections: the generality problem, ...
The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises...
Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memo...
Less discussed than Hume’s skepticism about what grounds there could be for projecting empirical hyp...
Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I sho...
In this chapter, I present and explore various arguments for skepticism that are related to memory. ...
Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the r...
Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-86)In this thesis, I examine the structure of epistemic j...
In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified bel...
The “problem of memory” in epistemology is concerned with whether and how we could have knowledge, o...
There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude like: The Principle of Inferential Just...
I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it...
According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say...
Reliability theories of epistemic justification face three main objections: the generality problem, ...
The problem of skepticism is often understood as a paradox: a valid argument with plausible premises...
Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memo...
Less discussed than Hume’s skepticism about what grounds there could be for projecting empirical hyp...
Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I sho...
In this chapter, I present and explore various arguments for skepticism that are related to memory. ...
Fumerton’s distinctive brand of metaepistemological scepticism is compared and contrasted with the r...
Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-86)In this thesis, I examine the structure of epistemic j...
In 'The Weakness of Strong Justification' Wayne Riggs claims that the requirement that justified bel...
The “problem of memory” in epistemology is concerned with whether and how we could have knowledge, o...
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