Add to ORKGI consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical costs and tensions associated with endorsing inferentialism
It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a prio...
Most internalist views hold that experience provides evidential justification for perceptual belief,...
Noninferentialism about a class of beliefs is roughly the view that the justification or fixation of...
There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude like: The Principle of Inferential Just...
The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reasoning requires that...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1997I aim to construct a partial account of inferential e...
Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justification and knowledge, and a great number of e...
There is a felt difference between following an argument to its conclusion and keeping up with an ar...
According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say...
Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as bel...
Reliability theories of epistemic justification face three main objections: the generality problem, ...
In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton¿s Principle of Inferential Justification d...
It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a prio...
Most internalist views hold that experience provides evidential justification for perceptual belief,...
Noninferentialism about a class of beliefs is roughly the view that the justification or fixation of...
There is an argumentative route that begins with a platitude like: The Principle of Inferential Just...
The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reasoning requires that...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1997I aim to construct a partial account of inferential e...
Nearly everyone agrees that perception gives us justification and knowledge, and a great number of e...
There is a felt difference between following an argument to its conclusion and keeping up with an ar...
According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is misleading or wrong to say...
Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as bel...
Reliability theories of epistemic justification face three main objections: the generality problem, ...
In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton¿s Principle of Inferential Justification d...
It is commonly held that our intuitive judgements about imaginary problem cases are justified a prio...
Most internalist views hold that experience provides evidential justification for perceptual belief,...
Noninferentialism about a class of beliefs is roughly the view that the justification or fixation of...