Add to ORKGThis paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are perfectly informed, optimal sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on enforcement resources by reducing the probability of apprehension while increasing sanctions. But when individuals imperfectly observe the probability of apprehension, it may be optimal to apply lower sanctions while expending more enforcement resources.
The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among vari...
The burden of proof is a central feature of adjudication, and analogues exist in many other settings...
We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and en...
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and sev...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
It is a widely accepted conclusion of the economic literature on optimal law enforcement that nonmon...
We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with a...
We study the optimal use of imprisonment when enforcement efforts are general (i.e. when the probabi...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal enforcement of the penal code when criminals...
In this article I derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehe...
Offenders differ with respect to their detection probability in reality. Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) c...
This paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorpora...
We consider a model of crime with rational Bayesian Jurors. We find that if jurors are not perfectly...
Enforcement is a costly endeavor. Thus, governments ought to be innovative in designing less costly ...
The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among vari...
The burden of proof is a central feature of adjudication, and analogues exist in many other settings...
We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and en...
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and sev...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
It is a widely accepted conclusion of the economic literature on optimal law enforcement that nonmon...
We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with a...
We study the optimal use of imprisonment when enforcement efforts are general (i.e. when the probabi...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal enforcement of the penal code when criminals...
In this article I derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehe...
Offenders differ with respect to their detection probability in reality. Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) c...
This paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorpora...
We consider a model of crime with rational Bayesian Jurors. We find that if jurors are not perfectly...
Enforcement is a costly endeavor. Thus, governments ought to be innovative in designing less costly ...
The authors characterize optimal enforcement in a setting in which individuals can select among vari...
The burden of proof is a central feature of adjudication, and analogues exist in many other settings...
We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and en...