Add to ORKGWe show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions concerning the efficiency of private versus public enforcement are drawn
In this article I derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehe...
In this paper, we amend the standard model of law enforcement, by introducing a marginal cost of pub...
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantiall...
We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with a...
We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and en...
This paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorpora...
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the agent can bribe t...
This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the prob...
We model the investigation of criminal activity as a principal-agent-monitor prob-lem in which the a...
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and sev...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
Enforcement is a costly endeavor. Thus, governments ought to be innovative in designing less costly ...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
We study the problem of a principal who relies on the reports of a monitor to pro-vide incentives to...
The most common pecuniary sanction, i.e. fixed-fines, places an emphasis on the severity of the crim...
In this article I derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehe...
In this paper, we amend the standard model of law enforcement, by introducing a marginal cost of pub...
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantiall...
We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with a...
We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and en...
This paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorpora...
We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the agent can bribe t...
This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed about the prob...
We model the investigation of criminal activity as a principal-agent-monitor prob-lem in which the a...
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and sev...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
Enforcement is a costly endeavor. Thus, governments ought to be innovative in designing less costly ...
This paper extends Malik's (1990) analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public...
We study the problem of a principal who relies on the reports of a monitor to pro-vide incentives to...
The most common pecuniary sanction, i.e. fixed-fines, places an emphasis on the severity of the crim...
In this article I derive the relationship between the optimal penalty and the probability of apprehe...
In this paper, we amend the standard model of law enforcement, by introducing a marginal cost of pub...
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantiall...