Add to ORKGWe evaluate the accuracy of power indices by experimentally measuring the political power embodied in blocks of votes per se. The experiment incorporates several subjects interacting in online chat rooms under supervision. Chat rooms and processes for selecting subjects reduce or eliminate extraneous political forces leaving logrolling as the primary political force. Results show that two standard power indices reflect voting power while other power indices and proportionality do not.Voting, Power Index, P Power, Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, Johnston, Burgin, Experiment.
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power ...
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or a...
We evaluate power indices by experimentally measuring the political power embodied in blocks of vote...
We investigate the applicability of voting power indices, in particular the Penrose index (aka absol...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...
What do the UN Security Council, the Electoral College and a company\u27s board of directors have in...
In an election, voting power—the probability that a single vote is decisive—is affected by the rule ...
Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a ...
summary:Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and accou...
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or a...
Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a ...
Abstract: Analysis of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union shows that there is a serious ...
This paper argues that the voting power approach is much more general than is portrayed by Albert (“...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power ...
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or a...
We evaluate power indices by experimentally measuring the political power embodied in blocks of vote...
We investigate the applicability of voting power indices, in particular the Penrose index (aka absol...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...
What do the UN Security Council, the Electoral College and a company\u27s board of directors have in...
In an election, voting power—the probability that a single vote is decisive—is affected by the rule ...
Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a ...
summary:Using players’ Shapley–Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and accou...
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or a...
Power indices are general measures of the relative a priori voting power of individual members of a ...
Abstract: Analysis of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union shows that there is a serious ...
This paper argues that the voting power approach is much more general than is portrayed by Albert (“...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power ...
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or a...