What do the UN Security Council, the Electoral College and a company\u27s board of directors have in common? They are weighted voting systems, in which voters may have different numbers of votes, and a quota must be met in order to make a decision. However, actual power is not directly proportional to the number of votes held. The common good power index measures power by counting the number of times that a voter appears in ``minimum winning coalitions\u27\u27: groups of voters that have quota, but would lose quota if any member exited the coalition. This measure of power is motivated by the observations that: a) coalitions larger than minimum winning coalitions rarely form and b) all members of a minimum winning coalition are equally neces...
AbstractWeighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi...
In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, ...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
We evaluate the accuracy of power indices by experimentally measuring the political power embodied i...
We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that ha...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
In his well known 1971 paper the mathematical sociologist James S. Coleman, proposed three measures ...
In his well known 1971 paper the mathematical sociologist James S. Coleman, proposed three measures ...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
In an election, voting power—the probability that a single vote is decisive—is affected by the rule ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Weighted voting games provide a popular model of decision making in multiagent systems. Such games a...
Two models are developed of the relative power of voters in a voting body, both based on the idea of...
AbstractWeighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi...
In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, ...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
We evaluate the accuracy of power indices by experimentally measuring the political power embodied i...
We investigate the method of power indices to study voting power of members of a legislature that ha...
Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan–P...
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi-agent s...
In his well known 1971 paper the mathematical sociologist James S. Coleman, proposed three measures ...
In his well known 1971 paper the mathematical sociologist James S. Coleman, proposed three measures ...
Abstract This paper suggests an indicator of power in weighted majority games. An indicator of power...
In an election, voting power—the probability that a single vote is decisive—is affected by the rule ...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Weighted voting games provide a popular model of decision making in multiagent systems. Such games a...
Two models are developed of the relative power of voters in a voting body, both based on the idea of...
AbstractWeighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and multi...
In this paper we propose a new power index useful for the evaluation of each member in a committee, ...
Voting power indexes such as that of Banzhaf (1965) are derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the ...