In this paper they study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. The main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. The results lend support to the tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.[IZA DP No. 395]Bargaining, public sector, stakeholders, strikes, labour relations
Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, w...
International audienceWe propose a model of strikes in a relational (or self-enforcing) contract fra...
International audienceWe propose a model of strikes in a relational (or self-enforcing) contract fra...
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys ...
The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties dire...
The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties dire...
Abstract We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, tha...
Instead of implementing efficient states, we observe that negotiations often end with inefficient ou...
We study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a represen...
This article proposes a new theoretical framework to explain the role of third-party facilitators in...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
Negotiations in the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers are highly secretive, so outsiders have...
Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, w...
International audienceWe propose a model of strikes in a relational (or self-enforcing) contract fra...
International audienceWe propose a model of strikes in a relational (or self-enforcing) contract fra...
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys ...
The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties dire...
The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties dire...
Abstract We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, tha...
Instead of implementing efficient states, we observe that negotiations often end with inefficient ou...
We study bargaining situations in which one side consists of a group of people, who elect a represen...
This article proposes a new theoretical framework to explain the role of third-party facilitators in...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
Negotiations in the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers are highly secretive, so outsiders have...
Cross-sectoral strategic negotiation is a key challenge in PPPs. Based on framing and game theory, w...
International audienceWe propose a model of strikes in a relational (or self-enforcing) contract fra...
International audienceWe propose a model of strikes in a relational (or self-enforcing) contract fra...