In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeholders' private endowments. Both the two stakeholders and third-party arbitrators may influence the outcome. We consider Nash-demand negotiations, where the two stakeholders place demands and share the pie accordingly if demands are compatible, and elicit dictatorial allocations from the stakeholders and the arbitrators. The Nash demands by stakeholders are strategic; the dictatorial allocations by stakeholders and arbitrators are non-strategic. We are interested in the influence of the past arbitrator experience on stakeholder allocations and demands and the past stakeholder experience on third-party arbitration allocations. We find that the...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, tha...
Disputes occurring in PPP projects pervade three interfacing levels of agreements: internal, downstr...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys ...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
abstract: I study split-pie bargaining problems between two agents. In chapter two, the types of bot...
We study experimentally to what extent distributive fairness decisions by impartial authorities are ...
We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stake...
We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stake...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, tha...
Disputes occurring in PPP projects pervade three interfacing levels of agreements: internal, downstr...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeh...
We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, that enjoys ...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
abstract: I study split-pie bargaining problems between two agents. In chapter two, the types of bot...
We study experimentally to what extent distributive fairness decisions by impartial authorities are ...
We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stake...
We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stake...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We study bilateral bargaining problems with an interested third party, the stakeholder, tha...
Disputes occurring in PPP projects pervade three interfacing levels of agreements: internal, downstr...