We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from directly reducing the damage caused by climate change, may also indirectly mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the stable size of international agreements on emission reductions. Moreover, we show that the more effective the adaptive measure in terms of reducing the marginal damage from emissions, the larger the stable size of the international environmental agreement. In addition, we show that larger coalitions, in the presence of adaptation, may lead to lower global emission levels and higher welfare
Since the benefits of adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change will accrue primarily (albei...
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) ...
The latest round of international negotiations in Copenhagen led to a set of commitments on emission...
We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from dir...
We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from dir...
International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation / Walid Marrouch, Amrita Ray C...
While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to b...
This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement....
We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses pertaining t...
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of th...
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of th...
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of th...
A paraîtreWe study how the adaptation strategy (private good), in addition to mitigation (public goo...
We examine the stability of international environmental agreements when they include both adaptation...
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) ...
Since the benefits of adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change will accrue primarily (albei...
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) ...
The latest round of international negotiations in Copenhagen led to a set of commitments on emission...
We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from dir...
We show that adaptive measures undertaken by countries in the face of climate change, apart from dir...
International Environmental Agreements in the Presence of Adaptation / Walid Marrouch, Amrita Ray C...
While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to b...
This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement....
We examine the stability of international environmental agreements that include clauses pertaining t...
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of th...
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of th...
This paper analyses, within a standard International Environmental Agreement game, the effect of th...
A paraîtreWe study how the adaptation strategy (private good), in addition to mitigation (public goo...
We examine the stability of international environmental agreements when they include both adaptation...
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) ...
Since the benefits of adapting to the adverse impacts of climate change will accrue primarily (albei...
We analyze the strategic interaction between mitigation (public good) and adaptation (private good) ...
The latest round of international negotiations in Copenhagen led to a set of commitments on emission...