The multi premise closure principle states that the logical conjunction of known facts yields again a known fact. For absolute knowledge this principle holds. We show that for fallible knowledge, assuming knowing requires a minimum level of statistical certainty (whatever else it requires), and that there is a sufficient number of known facts above a given level of uncertainty, it does not hold, for simple statistical reasons. We present a modified version, the dependent conjunctive closure principle, that does hold
Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted ...
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the th...
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument that, starting from the plainly innocent assumption th...
The multi premise closure principle states that the logical conjunction of known facts yields again ...
It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the follo...
We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases som...
Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘...
The Church–Fitch argument, or 'paradox' of knowability, apparently shows that, if all truths are kno...
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and it...
We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases som...
It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has be...
The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented empirical finding that subjects sometimes rate a conj...
Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses...
According to the principle of Conjunction Closure, if one has justification for believing each of a ...
Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted ...
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the th...
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument that, starting from the plainly innocent assumption th...
The multi premise closure principle states that the logical conjunction of known facts yields again ...
It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the follo...
We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases som...
Does a factive conception of knowability figure in ordinary use? There is some reason to think so. ‘...
The Church–Fitch argument, or 'paradox' of knowability, apparently shows that, if all truths are kno...
The conjunction fallacy has been a key topic in debates on the rationality of human reasoning and it...
We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases som...
It is widely thought that knowledge is factive – only truths can be known. However, this view has be...
The conjunction fallacy is the well-documented empirical finding that subjects sometimes rate a conj...
Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses...
According to the principle of Conjunction Closure, if one has justification for believing each of a ...
Crupi, Fitelson, and Tentori (CFT, forthcoming) offer three conditions that constitute an attempted ...
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the th...
The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument that, starting from the plainly innocent assumption th...