From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism

In his recent essays and especially his recent book Moral Thinking Professor Hare developed universal prescriptivism and advocated a kind of utilitarianism which he calls a Kantian. Introducing his new theory, I tried to make clear what he means by Kantian kind of utilitarianism. Intuitionist deontologists have been making attacks against crude forms of act-utilitarianism, saying that utilitarians must, from their total-utility principle, judge that those actions which are justified by ordinary people's sound intuitions must be wrong. The method which Professor Hare uses is, on the one hand, to put oneself in others positions with all their desires and interests. His version of utilitarianism can, he says, be defended from the deontologist attack in this way: if utilitarians in 'giving equal weight to the equal interests of parties' take account of the desires and interests which would be deppressed by the proposed act, then he must probably disagree with crude act-utilitarianism, must share with intuitionists the sound intuitions which people usually have. This defence is to be derived from the critical moral thinking made on one level in his two-tier theory, the other level being intuitive level. His argument against deontologists becomes easier, on the other hand, if we use the intuitive-level moral thinking, because on intuitive level we are incalcated in moral disposition to act according to our general intuitive principles, which, though called prima facie principles, are by no means the rules of thumb. This is a Harean version of rule-utilitarianism. In critical moral thinking he uses universalistic act-utilitarianism which can be distinguished from crude forms of act-utilitarianism by the former's having the character of universalizability-thesis; act-utilitarianism emerges, in this way, into specific rule-utilitarianism. Accordingly it is clear that the rules are universal, whether general or specific. In these twofold senses, I think, the Harean type of utilitarianism has a Kantian element. R. Brandt, in his A Theory of the Good and the Right has criticized Hare's recent theory, saying that: (1) we must know all the fact before we act; this brings in complications arising both from the variety of desires of all the parties and from limiting the number of people whom the consequences of the proposed action would affect, (2) the two-tier theory leads to the conclusion that on occasion the morally good act is one that is not morally right. This criticism can also be answered, I think, by using the two-level theory; i.e. (1) Any theory giving weight to benevolence or interests of parties must, in any way, know all the fact concerning the situation and desires of parties but we cannot always know all the relevant facts, and it is for this reason that the general prima facie principles are required. Therefore we must meet such cases by using intuitive moral thinking. (2) The morally good act is usually the kind of act chosen by good men with good intuitive dispositions, but this act is not always a morally right one on critical level. But, if we consider as a whole those cases which were decided on intuitive level in the situations of extreme difficulties and ignorance, if moreover we imagine that in all these cases critical moral thinking was practiced before we began acting, and if we compare the both, then we shall find that former cases would be more exempted from danger of evil consequences than the latter ones; so the former are better and therefore right as a whole. In this sense the good act done by good men is a right act after all