Add to ORKGCoder’s argument is very similar to Lewis’ one: he maintains that some human beings are not able to follow Gödel’s theorem, so Lucas’ argument cannot show that their minds are not machines. The answer of Lucas is that one proposed against Lewis’ criticism, that is that Mechanism makes a universal claim and so a single counter-example – a single mind producing a singe truth not recognizable by any machine – is a disproof for it
Gödel's theorem is consistent with the computationalist hypothesis. Roger Penrose, however, cla...
We shall present some relations between consistency and reflection principles which explain why is G...
Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attent...
These two articles are very interesting examples of how Lucas’ argument is not a direct proof but a ...
In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machin...
Can the human mind be properly described in mechanical terms? It is in order to demonstrate that it ...
Hutton asserts that Lucas’ use of Gödel’s theorem against Mechanism is incorrect because of the impo...
In this paper Lucas comes back to Gödelian argument against Mecanism to clarify some points. First o...
In the 1960s, the philosophers J.R. Lucas and Paul Benacerraf presented arguments against mechanism...
Benacerraf criticizes Lucas’ argument against Mechanism because, in his opinion, it depends too muc...
Sections 3.16 and 3.23. of Roger Penrose's Shadows of the mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 199...
In a recent paper Norman Malcolm has argued that mechanism is an inconceiv-able position. ' By ...
AbstractGödel's theorem is consistent with the computationalist hypothesis. Roger Penrose, however, ...
In this paper Lucas suggests that many of his critics have not read carefully neither his exposition...
Storrs McCall continues the tradition of Lucas and Penrose in an attempt to refute mechanism by appe...
Gödel's theorem is consistent with the computationalist hypothesis. Roger Penrose, however, cla...
We shall present some relations between consistency and reflection principles which explain why is G...
Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attent...
These two articles are very interesting examples of how Lucas’ argument is not a direct proof but a ...
In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machin...
Can the human mind be properly described in mechanical terms? It is in order to demonstrate that it ...
Hutton asserts that Lucas’ use of Gödel’s theorem against Mechanism is incorrect because of the impo...
In this paper Lucas comes back to Gödelian argument against Mecanism to clarify some points. First o...
In the 1960s, the philosophers J.R. Lucas and Paul Benacerraf presented arguments against mechanism...
Benacerraf criticizes Lucas’ argument against Mechanism because, in his opinion, it depends too muc...
Sections 3.16 and 3.23. of Roger Penrose's Shadows of the mind (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 199...
In a recent paper Norman Malcolm has argued that mechanism is an inconceiv-able position. ' By ...
AbstractGödel's theorem is consistent with the computationalist hypothesis. Roger Penrose, however, ...
In this paper Lucas suggests that many of his critics have not read carefully neither his exposition...
Storrs McCall continues the tradition of Lucas and Penrose in an attempt to refute mechanism by appe...
Gödel's theorem is consistent with the computationalist hypothesis. Roger Penrose, however, cla...
We shall present some relations between consistency and reflection principles which explain why is G...
Certain selected issues around the Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments which have received less attent...