Considerable experimental evidence indicates that reciprocity and inequality aversion are important motivations to understand deviations from self-interested behavior, and in particular costly punishment and reward. We use a within-subject experimental design to evaluate the share of subjects whose second-party reward and punishment choices are best accounted for by pure reciprocity, pure inequality aversion, a mixture of these two motives, or other motivations like altruism or competitiveness. We find that the largest fraction of punishment and rewards is motivated by a mixture of both inequality aversion and reciprocity, while smaller fractions are primarily motivated by pure inequality aversion and pure reciprocity. These findings provid...
Previous theorizing about punishment has suggested that humans desire to punish inequality per se. H...
Humans often cooperate, voluntarily paying an individual cost to supply a benefit to others. Public ...
Recent research has shown that individuals are prepared to incur costs to punish non-cooperators, ev...
Abstract: We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations...
We explores the motivations behind costly punishment in social dilemmas, specifically focusing on re...
Do people have a stronger propensity to reward or punish? When reacting to intentions, Offerman (200...
We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations behind co...
While the opportunity to punish selfish and reward generous behavior coexist in many instances in da...
Reciprocal behavioral has been found to play a significant role in many economic domains, including ...
Cooperation among people who are not related to each other is sustained by the availability of punis...
Abstract Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenan...
This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It ...
An online survey with 115 participants, conducted between February and May 2020, delivered results o...
We study the co-evolutionary emergence of fairness preferences in the form of other-regarding behavi...
Recent developments in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that many people display oth...
Previous theorizing about punishment has suggested that humans desire to punish inequality per se. H...
Humans often cooperate, voluntarily paying an individual cost to supply a benefit to others. Public ...
Recent research has shown that individuals are prepared to incur costs to punish non-cooperators, ev...
Abstract: We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations...
We explores the motivations behind costly punishment in social dilemmas, specifically focusing on re...
Do people have a stronger propensity to reward or punish? When reacting to intentions, Offerman (200...
We design experiments to study the extent to which individuals differ in their motivations behind co...
While the opportunity to punish selfish and reward generous behavior coexist in many instances in da...
Reciprocal behavioral has been found to play a significant role in many economic domains, including ...
Cooperation among people who are not related to each other is sustained by the availability of punis...
Abstract Reward for altruism and punishment for selfishness are crucial components for the maintenan...
This experimental study investigates how behavior changes after punishment for an unkind action. It ...
An online survey with 115 participants, conducted between February and May 2020, delivered results o...
We study the co-evolutionary emergence of fairness preferences in the form of other-regarding behavi...
Recent developments in behavioral and experimental economics have shown that many people display oth...
Previous theorizing about punishment has suggested that humans desire to punish inequality per se. H...
Humans often cooperate, voluntarily paying an individual cost to supply a benefit to others. Public ...
Recent research has shown that individuals are prepared to incur costs to punish non-cooperators, ev...