We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of which contains three voters and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives, and one of which contains four voters and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives. We also provide an efficient way to decide whether a preference profile is single-crossing
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
Structured preference domains, such as, for example, the do-mains of single-peaked and single-crossi...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
If voters' preferences are one-dimensional, many hard problems in computational social choice become...
Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental ...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
Structured preference domains, such as, for example, the do-mains of single-peaked and single-crossi...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of ...
If voters' preferences are one-dimensional, many hard problems in computational social choice become...
Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental ...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certa...
Structured preference domains, such as, for example, the do-mains of single-peaked and single-crossi...