Formally Verified Isolation of DMA

Every computer having a network, USB or disk controller has a Direct Memory Access Controller (DMAC) which is configured by a driver to transfer data between the device and main memory. The DMAC, if wrongly configured, can therefore potentially leak sensitive data and overwrite critical memory to overtake the system. Since DMAC drivers tend to be buggy (due to their complexity), these attacks are a serious threat. This paper presents a general formal framework for modeling DMACs and verifying under which conditions they are isolated. These conditions can be used as a specification for guaranteeing that a driver configures the DMAC correctly. The framework provides general isolation theorems that are common to all DMACs, leaving to the user only the task of verifying proof obligations that are DMAC specific. This provides a reusable verification infrastructure that reduces the verification effort of DMACs. Models and proofs have been developed in the HOL4 interactive theorem prover. To demonstrate the usefulness of the framework, we instantiate it with a DMAC of a USB.Part of proceedings ISBN 978-3-85448-053-2QC 20230526