A common presumption, supported by some empirical evidence, is that the certainty of punishment is a more effective deterrent than the severity of punishment. In rational decision making models of crime, this presumption implies that offenders must be risk-seeking. Some scholars claim that this and other anomalous implications are caused by the exclusion of various behavioral considerations in theoretical analyses. This article investigates whether a model in which criminals over-weigh probabilities attached to more salient payoffs (as the term is used by Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer in a series of influential articles) performs better than simple expected utility theory in explaining criminal behavior that is more responsive to the cer...
Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can cor...
Is it rational to reduce criminal activities if punishments are increased? While intuition might sug...
Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the rewards ag...
A common presumption, supported by some empirical evidence, is that the certainty of punishment is a...
Abstract. In the late 60s, Gary Becker incorporated into his formal model of deterrence theory an ex...
Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The expected ...
There is a 250 year old presumption in the criminology and law enforcement literature that people ar...
The empirical literature on deterrence tends to find stronger and more consistent evidence in suppor...
Deterrence theorists and researchers have argued that the critical dimension of sanction certainty ...
It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty th...
In the late 60s, Gary Becker incorporated into his formal model of deterrence theory an explicit sta...
Criminal sanctions are usually public, stable and predictable. In contrast, the practices governing...
In this paper we explore the functional form of the risk-certainty effect for deterrence. Using a s...
Studies of criminal deterrence usually show an effect of certainty of punishment but often fail to f...
We show that whatever the representation of criminals' preferences under risk, the assumption accord...
Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can cor...
Is it rational to reduce criminal activities if punishments are increased? While intuition might sug...
Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the rewards ag...
A common presumption, supported by some empirical evidence, is that the certainty of punishment is a...
Abstract. In the late 60s, Gary Becker incorporated into his formal model of deterrence theory an ex...
Compliance with laws and regulations depends on the expected penalty facing violators. The expected ...
There is a 250 year old presumption in the criminology and law enforcement literature that people ar...
The empirical literature on deterrence tends to find stronger and more consistent evidence in suppor...
Deterrence theorists and researchers have argued that the critical dimension of sanction certainty ...
It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty th...
In the late 60s, Gary Becker incorporated into his formal model of deterrence theory an explicit sta...
Criminal sanctions are usually public, stable and predictable. In contrast, the practices governing...
In this paper we explore the functional form of the risk-certainty effect for deterrence. Using a s...
Studies of criminal deterrence usually show an effect of certainty of punishment but often fail to f...
We show that whatever the representation of criminals' preferences under risk, the assumption accord...
Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can cor...
Is it rational to reduce criminal activities if punishments are increased? While intuition might sug...
Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the rewards ag...