We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind-the-scenes intervention as well as governance-motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long-term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions
We analyse the motives and market valuation of voluntarily delisting from the London Stock Exchange....
I believe that tenured historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science—when presented with the...
Any compensation mechanism that is intended to reward superior investment performance can be gamed b...
We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of fir...
We document that an increase in short-horizon investors is associated with cuts to long-term investm...
We analyze contracts between a large buyer and her suppliers. We find that contracts with critical p...
The management of catastrophic risk comprises a growing social, political, and economic challenge of...
Long before the current financial and economic crisis, corporate governance and securities regulatio...
We hypothesize that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter assets from extraction by ...
This chapter, written for the Research Handbook on Shareholder Litigation, surveys empirical work st...
Purpose This study aims to answer the question, “Are people willing to forgo a portion of financia...
Robert Wade submitted the following letter to the Financial Times in response to an article titled ‘...
The financial crisis revealed the extent of the global financial system’s interconnectedness. Regula...
The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role p...
Recent studies have documented systematic exchanges of favors between politicians and firms, and tha...
We analyse the motives and market valuation of voluntarily delisting from the London Stock Exchange....
I believe that tenured historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science—when presented with the...
Any compensation mechanism that is intended to reward superior investment performance can be gamed b...
We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of fir...
We document that an increase in short-horizon investors is associated with cuts to long-term investm...
We analyze contracts between a large buyer and her suppliers. We find that contracts with critical p...
The management of catastrophic risk comprises a growing social, political, and economic challenge of...
Long before the current financial and economic crisis, corporate governance and securities regulatio...
We hypothesize that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter assets from extraction by ...
This chapter, written for the Research Handbook on Shareholder Litigation, surveys empirical work st...
Purpose This study aims to answer the question, “Are people willing to forgo a portion of financia...
Robert Wade submitted the following letter to the Financial Times in response to an article titled ‘...
The financial crisis revealed the extent of the global financial system’s interconnectedness. Regula...
The increase in institutional ownership of recent decades has been accompanied by an enhanced role p...
Recent studies have documented systematic exchanges of favors between politicians and firms, and tha...
We analyse the motives and market valuation of voluntarily delisting from the London Stock Exchange....
I believe that tenured historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science—when presented with the...
Any compensation mechanism that is intended to reward superior investment performance can be gamed b...