In this paper, we propose the use of interactive the- orem proving for explainable machine learning. After presenting our proposition, we illustrate it on the dedicated application of explaining security attacks using the Isabelle Infrastructure framework and its process of dependability engineering. This formal framework and process provides the logics for specifi- cation and modeling. Attacks on security of the system are ex- plained by specification and proofs in the Isabelle Infrastructure framework. Existing case studies of dependability engineering in Isabelle are used as feasibility studies to illustrate how different aspects of explanations are covered by the Isabelle Infrastructure framework
Abstract—We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover ...
Security modeling is the foundation to formal verification which is a core requirement for high ass...
In this paper, we integrate previously developed formal methods to model infrastructure, actors, and...
In this paper, we propose the use of interactive the- orem proving for explainable machine learning....
In this paper, we introduce a process of formal system development supported by interactive theorem ...
In this paper, we show a security engineering process based on a formal notion of refinement fully f...
Assurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. The use of formal methods in assuran...
Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal m...
In this paper, we present a proof theory for attack trees. Attack trees are a well established and u...
Attack trees are an important modeling formalism to identify and quantify attacks on security and pr...
Game-based proofs are a well-established paradigm for structuring security arguments and simplifying...
The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analy...
Avionics is one of the fields in which verification methods have been pioneered and brought a new le...
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive the-orem prover Isabelle/HOL and deri...
In this paper we combine formal modeling and analysis of infrastructures of organisations with socio...
Abstract—We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover ...
Security modeling is the foundation to formal verification which is a core requirement for high ass...
In this paper, we integrate previously developed formal methods to model infrastructure, actors, and...
In this paper, we propose the use of interactive the- orem proving for explainable machine learning....
In this paper, we introduce a process of formal system development supported by interactive theorem ...
In this paper, we show a security engineering process based on a formal notion of refinement fully f...
Assurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. The use of formal methods in assuran...
Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal m...
In this paper, we present a proof theory for attack trees. Attack trees are a well established and u...
Attack trees are an important modeling formalism to identify and quantify attacks on security and pr...
Game-based proofs are a well-established paradigm for structuring security arguments and simplifying...
The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analy...
Avionics is one of the fields in which verification methods have been pioneered and brought a new le...
We embed an untyped security protocol model in the interactive the-orem prover Isabelle/HOL and deri...
In this paper we combine formal modeling and analysis of infrastructures of organisations with socio...
Abstract—We embed an operational semantics for security protocols in the interactive theorem prover ...
Security modeling is the foundation to formal verification which is a core requirement for high ass...
In this paper, we integrate previously developed formal methods to model infrastructure, actors, and...