Security modeling is the foundation to formal verification which is a core requirement for high assurance systems. This thesis explores how security models can be built in a simple and expressive manner using the Metaslang specification language in Specware. The models are subsequently translated, via the Specware to Isabelle Interface, to be proven for correctness in Isabelle which is a generic, interactive theorem proving environment. It is found that the translation between Specware and Isabelle is almost seamless and there is much potential in the use of Isabelle/HOL to discharge proof obligations that arise in developing Specware specifications, although the actual proving requires substantial knowledge and experience in logica...
To achieve security certification according to the highest levels of assurance, formal models and pr...
Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal m...
In this paper, we outline our vision for building verification tools for Cyber-Physical Systems base...
Abstract. Isabelle/HOL is integrated with Specware in order to discharge proof obligations arising d...
International audienceNon-functional requirements such as Security and Dependability (S &D) become m...
Assurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. The use of formal methods in assuran...
We report on a case-study in using the data-oriented modeling language Z to formalize a security arc...
The date of receipt and acceptance will be inserted by the editor Abstract. We present a method for ...
To achieve security certification according to the highest levels of assurance, formal models and pr...
In this paper, we show a security engineering process based on a formal notion of refinement fully f...
Abstract Isabelle/SACM is a tool for automated construction of model-based assurance cases with int...
Abstract. We describe results and status of a sub project of the Verisoft [1] project. While the Ver...
The growing complexity and diversity of models used for engineering dependable systems implies that ...
Abstract. A number of current automated protocol verification tools are based on abstract interpreta...
A number of current automated protocol verification tools are based on abstract interpretation techn...
To achieve security certification according to the highest levels of assurance, formal models and pr...
Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal m...
In this paper, we outline our vision for building verification tools for Cyber-Physical Systems base...
Abstract. Isabelle/HOL is integrated with Specware in order to discharge proof obligations arising d...
International audienceNon-functional requirements such as Security and Dependability (S &D) become m...
Assurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. The use of formal methods in assuran...
We report on a case-study in using the data-oriented modeling language Z to formalize a security arc...
The date of receipt and acceptance will be inserted by the editor Abstract. We present a method for ...
To achieve security certification according to the highest levels of assurance, formal models and pr...
In this paper, we show a security engineering process based on a formal notion of refinement fully f...
Abstract Isabelle/SACM is a tool for automated construction of model-based assurance cases with int...
Abstract. We describe results and status of a sub project of the Verisoft [1] project. While the Ver...
The growing complexity and diversity of models used for engineering dependable systems implies that ...
Abstract. A number of current automated protocol verification tools are based on abstract interpreta...
A number of current automated protocol verification tools are based on abstract interpretation techn...
To achieve security certification according to the highest levels of assurance, formal models and pr...
Assurance cases (ACs) are often required to certify critical systems. The use of integrated formal m...
In this paper, we outline our vision for building verification tools for Cyber-Physical Systems base...