Groundup Ontology: A Cartesian Perspective & Exemplifications in Science

GroundUp Ontology: A Cartesian Perspective & Exemplifications in Science The first pathway toward a new conceptualist answer to the problem of universals begins with Descartes. The article is guided by the Cartesian method of starting anew and our knowledge of mind-dependent universals. Relevant examples and learning experiments defend and validate the pragmatic utility of conceptualism. It is past time for analytic ontology to set aside its presuppositions, examine how it works and simplify itself. I raise novel objections through metaphor and analogy against standard and Platonic realism, excepting geometric figures. Independent universals of realism are speculative and are neither necessary or sufficent. This rejection of metaphysical realism defends the validity of scientific empiricism. William James’ empirical conceptualism and J.S. Mill’s logical criticisms strengthen this study. My theory is confirmed and useful to a preliminary ontology of rocks which evaluates concepts and universals of mineral species. This illustration is consistent with Descartes’ theory of attributes, and offers a new approach to the field. The article, very long dormant, is made possible and inspired by Descartes’ philosophy and general method