Real-life collective epistemic virtue and vice

This chapter critically examines extant theorizations of collective epistemic virtue and vice. Epistemic virtues are features that make us excellent qua producers and consumers of epistemic goods, such as knowledge, understanding, or wisdom. By contrast, epistemic vices obstruct the realization of these epistemic goods. Virtue epistemologists disagree somewhat over the nature of these features. Epistemic arrogance is a canonical epistemic vice: a character trait that obstructs the realization of such epistemic goods as knowledge, understanding, and wisdom. Summativism enjoys a great deal of initial plausibility. On a functionalist analysis, groups possess agency insofar as they are systems that function as agents. In technology-intensive industries, most jobs have substantial epistemic components. Information sharing was minimal and discouraged throughout design and production processes. Organizations must offer supportive environments to enable epistemically virtuous individuals