Add to ORKGBased on primary survey data collected over two election cycles in a mountainous area in China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages, this paper examines whether or not elected village heads and appointed Communist party secretaries favor their own natural villages when distributing public resources. The analysis shows clear evidence of favoritism by both village heads and party secretaries. In a subsequent election, incumbent village heads who have shown strong favoritism are likely to lose, but resource distribution does not seem to affect the likelihood of the reappointment of a party secretary.Non-PRIFPRI1; GRP32DSG
This paper studies the impacts of village elections on the accountability of the village committee, ...
Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of eight Chinese provinces for th...
During our sample period from 1987 to 2002, Chinese villages completed the transition from governmen...
Based on primary survey data collected over two election cycles in a mountainous area in China, wher...
Do elected leaders in an authoritarian regime have any real power? Does grassroots democracy in a on...
The nature of the collective ownership may make it easier for the local governments to purse private...
Since the introduction of elections into Chinese villages two decades ago, many have viewed these e...
We argue that the choice of electoral rules in Chinese villages results from the incentives that rur...
A dual-power structure' governs the Chinese countryside. Branch committees of the Chinese Commu...
A key issue in political economy concerns the accountability that governance structures impose on pu...
China has experimented with village elections for nearly 20 years. Using village and household surve...
Since the early nineties, tens of thousands of villages have held elections of their leaders in rura...
This thesis investigates the effects of village economic wealth and economic autonomy on the authori...
Village elections in China present scholars with the case of a single-party regime that allows voter...
Fiscal mimicking and yardstick competition among neighboring jurisdictions have been widely document...
This paper studies the impacts of village elections on the accountability of the village committee, ...
Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of eight Chinese provinces for th...
During our sample period from 1987 to 2002, Chinese villages completed the transition from governmen...
Based on primary survey data collected over two election cycles in a mountainous area in China, wher...
Do elected leaders in an authoritarian regime have any real power? Does grassroots democracy in a on...
The nature of the collective ownership may make it easier for the local governments to purse private...
Since the introduction of elections into Chinese villages two decades ago, many have viewed these e...
We argue that the choice of electoral rules in Chinese villages results from the incentives that rur...
A dual-power structure' governs the Chinese countryside. Branch committees of the Chinese Commu...
A key issue in political economy concerns the accountability that governance structures impose on pu...
China has experimented with village elections for nearly 20 years. Using village and household surve...
Since the early nineties, tens of thousands of villages have held elections of their leaders in rura...
This thesis investigates the effects of village economic wealth and economic autonomy on the authori...
Village elections in China present scholars with the case of a single-party regime that allows voter...
Fiscal mimicking and yardstick competition among neighboring jurisdictions have been widely document...
This paper studies the impacts of village elections on the accountability of the village committee, ...
Using village and household survey data collected from 48 villages of eight Chinese provinces for th...
During our sample period from 1987 to 2002, Chinese villages completed the transition from governmen...