This paper is concerned with 2-person zero-sum games in normal form. It is investigated which pairs of optimal strategies form a perfect equilibrium point and which pairs of optimal strategies constitute a proper equilibrium point. It turns out that perfect and proper equilibria can be characterized by well-known notions which have been introduced by McKinsey and Dresher, respectively
We will consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game d...
Includes bibliographical references (page 61)This paper is a study of the related mathematical subje...
There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way "best re...
In the zero-sum (non-zero sum) completely mixed game each player has only one optimal (equilibrium) ...
Harsanyi introduced regular equilibrium points in [3] and proved that for almost all noncooperative ...
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if ...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
AbstractIt is shown that a necessary and sufficient condition that a point be a Nash equilibrium poi...
We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games. We show that even when players have diffe...
We consider linear-quadratic, two-person, zero-sum perfect information differential games, possibly ...
In many games, it is desirable to find strategies for all players that simultaneously maximize their...
In this paper the usual concept of optimality in a two person zero sum Markov game is studied. A nec...
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness con...
Two examples of strategic equilibrium are given, The first example is a two-person game with a uniqu...
We explain the concept and theory behind game theory and simulation. How game theory can be used to ...
We will consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game d...
Includes bibliographical references (page 61)This paper is a study of the related mathematical subje...
There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way "best re...
In the zero-sum (non-zero sum) completely mixed game each player has only one optimal (equilibrium) ...
Harsanyi introduced regular equilibrium points in [3] and proved that for almost all noncooperative ...
We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if ...
In the first chapter we present some proofs of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic gam...
AbstractIt is shown that a necessary and sufficient condition that a point be a Nash equilibrium poi...
We consider discounted repeated two-person zero-sum games. We show that even when players have diffe...
We consider linear-quadratic, two-person, zero-sum perfect information differential games, possibly ...
In many games, it is desirable to find strategies for all players that simultaneously maximize their...
In this paper the usual concept of optimality in a two person zero sum Markov game is studied. A nec...
This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness con...
Two examples of strategic equilibrium are given, The first example is a two-person game with a uniqu...
We explain the concept and theory behind game theory and simulation. How game theory can be used to ...
We will consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game d...
Includes bibliographical references (page 61)This paper is a study of the related mathematical subje...
There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way "best re...