Cyberattack Correlation and Mitigation for Distribution Systems via Machine Learning

Cyber-physical system security for electric distribution systems is critical. In direct switching attacks, often coordinated, attackers seek to toggle remote-controlled switches in the distribution network. Due to the typically radial operation, certain configurations may lead to outages and/or voltage violations. Existing optimization methods that model the interactions between the attacker and the power system operator (defender) assume knowledge of the attacker’s parameters. This reduces their usability. Furthermore, the trend with coordinated cyberattack detection has been the use of centralized mechanisms, correlating data from dispersed security systems. This can be prone to single point failures. In this paper, novel mathematical models are presented for the attacker and the defender. The models do not assume any knowledge of the attacker’s parameters by the defender. Instead, a machine learning (ML) technique implemented by a multi-agent system correlates detected attacks in a decentralized manner, predicting the targets of the attacker. Furthermore, agents learn optimal mitigation of the communication level through Q-learning. The learned attacker motive is also used by the defender to determine a new configuration of the distribution network. Simulations of the technique have been performed using the IEEE 123-Node Test Feeder. The simulation results validate the capability and performance of the algorithm