Toward secure VMs allocation : analysis of VMs allocation behaviours in the cloud computing environments

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) is a potential threat in cloud computing environments (CCEs) as it allows the malicious VMs to capture private information from the target VMs when they share the same PM. This malicious co-residency of VMs is an outcome of the VMs allocation algorithm behaviour, which is responsible for allocating the VMs to a specific PM based on defined allocation objectives. Earlier studies tackled the SCAs, through specific solutions, by focusing on either formulating VMs allocation algorithms or modifying the architecture of the CCEs to mitigate the threats of SCAs. However, most of them are oriented to specific situations and assumptions, leading to malicious co-residency when applied to other scopes or situations. In this paper, we presented the solution from a different holistic perspective by examining the allocation behaviours of different algorithms and other properties that affect and lead to obtaining a secure VMs allocation. The examinations are performed under different scenarios and structures for each behaviour to understand the possible situations that lead to secure VMs allocation. In addition, we develop a deterministic security-aware VMs allocation algorithm that aims to allocate the VMs securely to reduce the potential threats from malicious co-residency in CCEs