Strength‐is‐weakness: The (ir)relevant relation between resources and payoffs in coalition formation

A key observation in coalition formation is that bargainers who control many resources are often excluded from coalitions by bargainers who control few resources, the Strength-is-Weakness effect. We argue that this effect is contingent on whether resources provide a legitimate claim to be included in a coalition. Across three incentivized coalition experiments (n = 2745; 915 triads), three participants (player A had four resources, player B had three resources, player C had two resources) negotiated about a payoff of 90 monetary units. Depending on condition, these resources were obtained randomly, earned, or earned and proportionally linked to the payoff. Results showed player As were less included when resources were obtained randomly and more often included in coalitions when resources were earned and/or proportionally linked to the payoff. This provides evidence that the Strength-is-Weakness is contingent on the legitimacy of the resources