[89] Minimum Resource and Pivotal Power Theories A COMPETITIVE TEST IN FOUR-PERSON COALITIONAL SITUATIONS

This paper reports a competitive test of minimum resource and pivotal power theories in tetradic situations. Using resource distributions for which the theories make distinct predictions, the study obtained data on the formation of coalitions and the division of payoffs. Results indicate that minimum resource theory is superior to pivotal power theory in predicting coalition formation, especially for resource distributions where one member has veto capabilities. The theories perform equally well in predicting payoff division, with each able to explain a large proportion of the variation. Both theories are more accurate in predicting payoff division for nonveto situations than for veto situations Two major questions have guided research on coalition formation during the past twenty years: (a) given a coalitional situation where a number of persons must act in concert to obtain some fixed payoff, which one of several possible coalitions will actually form? (b) how will the members of the emergent coalition divide the payoff among themselves? Numerous independent variables are relevant to these issues, but theorists have paid particular attention to the initial distribution o