Add to ORKGIn the proposed framework, larger fine for evasion will increase tax compliance with ambiguous effects on corruption. Complete dissipation of rents in the public sector implies that the bribe and the level of corruption move in opposite directions following an increase in the fine for evasion. A larger fine for corruption will reduce corruption at the cost of reducing tax compliance. Albeit surprising, this result suggests that setting harsh fines for corruption is not necessarily an effective instrument for reducing the underlying offence
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The ...
Do developed countries experience extensive corruption and if so how should they treat it? Evidence ...
We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corru...
In the proposed framework, larger fine for evasion will increase tax compliance with ambiguous effec...
We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers may have incentives to evade taxes and ...
Our framed laboratory experiment analyses the causal relationship between corruption and tax evasion...
Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power — and the possibility thereof — are pervasive features of...
Avoidance and evasion continue to frustrate the government\u27s efforts to collect much needed tax r...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whi...
Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues of allowing fis...
The paper models tax evasion using a decentralized corruption service sector with a production funct...
Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests that inducing more fiscal corrupt...
We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and t...
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The ...
Do developed countries experience extensive corruption and if so how should they treat it? Evidence ...
We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corru...
In the proposed framework, larger fine for evasion will increase tax compliance with ambiguous effec...
We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers may have incentives to evade taxes and ...
Our framed laboratory experiment analyses the causal relationship between corruption and tax evasion...
Corruption, evasion and the abuse of power — and the possibility thereof — are pervasive features of...
Avoidance and evasion continue to frustrate the government\u27s efforts to collect much needed tax r...
In this paper we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread fiscal corruption in a static framew...
We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whi...
Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests there are virtues of allowing fis...
The paper models tax evasion using a decentralized corruption service sector with a production funct...
Recent literature on tax administration in poor countries suggests that inducing more fiscal corrupt...
We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and t...
Reduction of fiscal evasion may be pursued by introducing incentive schemes for tax inspectors. The ...
Do developed countries experience extensive corruption and if so how should they treat it? Evidence ...
We provide empirical support and a theoretical explanation for the vicious circle of political corru...