Add to ORKGThis paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of intergroup competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most inefficient equilibrium is always the stochastically stable one. Yet, it turns out that the `security\u27 of more efficient equilibria increases with a decrease of the number of players and with an increase of the number of competing groups
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from p...
We explore how individual equilibrium effort in tournaments varies with the number of contestants. T...
We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior i...
This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing pr...
We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal...
Within groups, members must coordinate on similar levels of effort in order to finish their tasks at...
We consider the repeated minimum-effort coordination game where each player follows an adaptive stra...
The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff fu...
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players...
The problem of coordination failure, particularly in \u27team production\u27 situations, is central ...
2Abstract: We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in...
The achievements of a group frequently depend on the efforts of just a few members but represent a p...
Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investi...
The minimum-effort coordination game draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior ...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from p...
We explore how individual equilibrium effort in tournaments varies with the number of contestants. T...
We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior i...
This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing pr...
We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal...
Within groups, members must coordinate on similar levels of effort in order to finish their tasks at...
We consider the repeated minimum-effort coordination game where each player follows an adaptive stra...
The literature on minimum effort game has been concerned with a symmetric game with linear payoff fu...
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players...
The problem of coordination failure, particularly in \u27team production\u27 situations, is central ...
2Abstract: We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in...
The achievements of a group frequently depend on the efforts of just a few members but represent a p...
Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investi...
The minimum-effort coordination game draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior ...
Coordination games have multiple Nash equilibria (i.e., sets of strategies which are best responses ...
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from p...
We explore how individual equilibrium effort in tournaments varies with the number of contestants. T...
We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior i...