Do you perceive what is going on into your own mind? Is pre-reflective self-consciousness a kind of perception—inner perception¬—analogous to sense perception? According to a respectable tradition, which goes back to Descartes, Locke and Brentano, the answer is yes: self-consciousness is analogous to sense perception. Other people, however, think the answer is no. In this paper, I argue that the analogy claim do capture some relevant features of self-consciousness. Relying on insights from Brentano, I offer a case for inner perception, push the analogy further, and draw some lessons as to what extent inner perception is a reliable source of knowledge.Renaissance of Philosophy at the Turn of 19th Century: The School of Franz Brentan
The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally be...
Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ‘I’-thoughts. Recently, it has been sugges...
peer reviewedIn this chapter, the author raises new objections to the self-representational reading ...
Do you perceive what is going on into your own mind? Is pre-reflective self-consciousness a kind of ...
Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and o...
In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of experience and self-c...
While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness,...
The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itsel...
It is natural to think that we are each aware of ourselves as bodily objects located in an extra-bo...
My goal, in this paper, is to answer the following question: should we understand inner consciousnes...
When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is ...
Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is th...
The paper aims at analyzing the inner development of self-identity from its pre-reflective level to ...
This paper is a defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self-concepts. We ...
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in...
The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally be...
Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ‘I’-thoughts. Recently, it has been sugges...
peer reviewedIn this chapter, the author raises new objections to the self-representational reading ...
Do you perceive what is going on into your own mind? Is pre-reflective self-consciousness a kind of ...
Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and o...
In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of experience and self-c...
While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness,...
The Brentanian idea that every state of consciousness involves a consciousness or awareness of itsel...
It is natural to think that we are each aware of ourselves as bodily objects located in an extra-bo...
My goal, in this paper, is to answer the following question: should we understand inner consciousnes...
When you are in a joyful mood, how do you know that it is so? On a Cartesian picture, the answer is ...
Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is th...
The paper aims at analyzing the inner development of self-identity from its pre-reflective level to ...
This paper is a defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self-concepts. We ...
Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in...
The psychological reality of an inner awareness built into conscious experience has traditionally be...
Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ‘I’-thoughts. Recently, it has been sugges...
peer reviewedIn this chapter, the author raises new objections to the self-representational reading ...