Add to ORKGIn this paper, I analyze how voters optimally aggregate and use the information provided by informed experts. I find that, when citizens do not observe the vested interest of each expert and their interests are sufficiently correlated, the relationship between the share of experts endorsing an alternative and the share of citizens voting for it is non-monotonic. The explanation is that consensus among experts can be reached either because all experts share the same information or because they ignore the information they have and provide their advice according to their interests. The non-monotonic result holds even if experts are strategic
abstract: While expert groups often make recommendations on a range of non-controversial as well as ...
We study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests. Committee members do no...
We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively cho...
In representative democracy, voters elect candidates who strategically propose policies. In a common...
This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member recei...
Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to th...
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
Published ArticleThe paper is concerned with the problem of Bayesian decision-makers seeking consens...
We consider here how democracy cannot be reduced to consensus and majorityvoting without taking in c...
We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse can-didates a...
The 2016 election campaign has been already been marked by the preponderance of ‘expert’ pundits who...
We study a model of consensus decision making in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choo...
The problem of the proper role of knowledge in political decision-making is a traditional and major ...
In this paper, I argue that expert disagreement can pose a deep problem for democracy. In order to f...
abstract: While expert groups often make recommendations on a range of non-controversial as well as ...
We study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests. Committee members do no...
We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively cho...
In representative democracy, voters elect candidates who strategically propose policies. In a common...
This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member recei...
Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to th...
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
Published ArticleThe paper is concerned with the problem of Bayesian decision-makers seeking consens...
We consider here how democracy cannot be reduced to consensus and majorityvoting without taking in c...
We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse can-didates a...
The 2016 election campaign has been already been marked by the preponderance of ‘expert’ pundits who...
We study a model of consensus decision making in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choo...
The problem of the proper role of knowledge in political decision-making is a traditional and major ...
In this paper, I argue that expert disagreement can pose a deep problem for democracy. In order to f...
abstract: While expert groups often make recommendations on a range of non-controversial as well as ...
We study theoretically and experimentally a committee with common interests. Committee members do no...
We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively cho...