Add to ORKGWe present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse can-didates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts ’ interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert influence is fully de-centralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
Five days in advance of the 2005 German national election, political experts, voters, and novices we...
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests ar...
We study elections between two candidates who hold some private information valuable for the whole e...
We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identifi...
Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democ...
In this paper, I analyze how voters optimally aggregate and use the information provided by informed...
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests ar...
The decision of an individual to vote or not and to choose one of the candidates participating in th...
"Five days in advance of the 2005 German national election, political experts, voters, and novices w...
The 2016 election campaign has been already been marked by the preponderance of ‘expert’ pundits who...
Abstract. We consider a model of two-candidate elections with a one-dimensional policy space. Spendi...
Available online 1 December 2020We construct an election game to study the electoral impacts of bias...
There are large gaps in opinion between policy experts and the public on a wide variety of issues. S...
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
Five days in advance of the 2005 German national election, political experts, voters, and novices we...
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests ar...
We study elections between two candidates who hold some private information valuable for the whole e...
We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identifi...
Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democ...
In this paper, I analyze how voters optimally aggregate and use the information provided by informed...
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests ar...
The decision of an individual to vote or not and to choose one of the candidates participating in th...
"Five days in advance of the 2005 German national election, political experts, voters, and novices w...
The 2016 election campaign has been already been marked by the preponderance of ‘expert’ pundits who...
Abstract. We consider a model of two-candidate elections with a one-dimensional policy space. Spendi...
Available online 1 December 2020We construct an election game to study the electoral impacts of bias...
There are large gaps in opinion between policy experts and the public on a wide variety of issues. S...
This article analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with cont...
This paper analyzes participation and information aggregation in a common-value election with contin...
Five days in advance of the 2005 German national election, political experts, voters, and novices we...