We describe a flow model related to ordinary network flows the same way as stable matchings are related to maximum matchings in bipartite graphs. We prove that there always exists a stable flow and generalize the lattice structure of stable marriages to stable flows. Our main tool is a straightforward reduction of the stable flow problem to stable allocations. For the sake of completeness, we prove the results we need on stable allocations as an application of Tarski’s fixed point theorem
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
We extend the stable flow model of Fleiner to multicommodity flows. In addition to the preference li...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
We describe a flow model related to ordinary network flows the same way as stable matchings are rela...
AbstractIn a network stability problem, the aim is to find stable configurations for a given network...
This paper presents a theory of matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching i...
In this paper, the notion of stability is extended to network flows over time. As a useful device in...
Abstract. In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm ...
Ostrovsky (2008) [9] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given net...
AbstractWe consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indiffer...
AbstractThe theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the s...
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in ...
Stable matching (also called stable marriage in the literature) is a problem of matching in a bipart...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by klaus and klijn (j...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
We extend the stable flow model of Fleiner to multicommodity flows. In addition to the preference li...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
We describe a flow model related to ordinary network flows the same way as stable matchings are rela...
AbstractIn a network stability problem, the aim is to find stable configurations for a given network...
This paper presents a theory of matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching i...
In this paper, the notion of stability is extended to network flows over time. As a useful device in...
Abstract. In two-sided matching markets in which some doctors form couples, we present an algorithm ...
Ostrovsky (2008) [9] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given net...
AbstractWe consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indiffer...
AbstractThe theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the s...
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in ...
Stable matching (also called stable marriage in the literature) is a problem of matching in a bipart...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by klaus and klijn (j...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
We extend the stable flow model of Fleiner to multicommodity flows. In addition to the preference li...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...