We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered). We prove that, in an instance where indifference takes the form of ties, the set of strongly stable matchings forms a distributive lattice. However, we show that this lattice structure may be absent if indifference is in the form of arbitrary partial orders. Also, for a given stable marriage instance with ties, we characterise strongly stable matchings in terms of perfect matchings in bipartite graphs. Finally, we briefly outline an alternative proof of the known result that, in a stable marriage instance with indifference in the form of arbitrary partial orders, the set of su...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or th...
AbstractWe consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indiffer...
AbstractRelaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage prob...
Relaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage problem to a...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfie...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the pr...
We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in ...
AbstractA stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates pr...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
In the stable matching problem, given a two-sided matching market where each agent has ordinal prefe...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or th...
AbstractWe consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indiffer...
AbstractRelaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage prob...
Relaxing the total orders of the preference lists of an instance of the stable marriage problem to a...
AbstractIt is well known that every instance of the classical stable marriage problem admits at leas...
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfie...
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962)....
Abstract. We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the pr...
We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in ...
AbstractA stable matching for an instance of the stable marriages problem or the stable roommates pr...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement ...
AbstractIt is well-known that the structure of the set of stable marriages of a stable marriage inst...
In the stable matching problem, given a two-sided matching market where each agent has ordinal prefe...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or th...