In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an uninvolved observer - or third party - whose payoff is unaffected by the behavior of the same agent. In our research, we attempt to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP-PD) with a sample of Camorra prison inmates. We then compare the decisions of the Camorra inmates with the behavior of university students with similar social and economic backgrounds. Our primary conclusion is that there are significant differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior. Keywords: Camorra, prison inmates, social values, social norms, sanction, punishment, recipr...
We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experim...
open2noWe study the effect of social influence on agentsâ decisions to engage in costly decentralize...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a ...
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a...
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a...
In this paper, we report the results of two experiments, each comprising two designs (a prisoner dil...
In this paper we report the results of two experiments, each one comprising two designs (a prisoner ...
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which provides insights into the soc...
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which provides insights into the soc...
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into ...
This work focuses on costly punishment imposed by unaffected observing third parties in economic exp...
This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an econ...
We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experim...
open2noWe study the effect of social influence on agentsâ decisions to engage in costly decentralize...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a ...
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a...
In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a...
In this paper, we report the results of two experiments, each comprising two designs (a prisoner dil...
In this paper we report the results of two experiments, each one comprising two designs (a prisoner ...
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which provides insights into the soc...
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which provides insights into the soc...
This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into ...
This work focuses on costly punishment imposed by unaffected observing third parties in economic exp...
This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an econ...
We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experim...
open2noWe study the effect of social influence on agentsâ decisions to engage in costly decentralize...
Norms of cooperation and punishment differ across societies, but also within a single society. In an...