Why Shouldn't We Think that Cognition Has Proprietary Phenomenal Character?

In this dissertation, I address the issue of whether there is any proprietary phenomenalcharacter necessary for thought, concluding that we have no non-circular justification for holding such a view. After a brief introduction, in Chapter 2, I discuss the distinction between cognitive and noncognitive mental states, according to which cognitive mental states are conceptual and noncognitive mental states are not. I then provide an overview of the cognitive phenomenology debate, arguing that the debate should be understood based on the metaphysical nature of thought and its relationship with phenomenal character. Finally, I introduce views I call phenomenal cognitive phenomenology (phenomenal CP), moderate cognitive phenomenology (moderate CP), and strong cognitive phenomenology (strong CP). I then argue that the denial of any of these positive views offers a better explanation for any phenomenal character associated with thought.In Chapter 3, I critically evaluate various arguments for and against the various viewson cognitive phenomenology, including self-knowledge arguments, phenomenal contrast arguments, introspection-based arguments, and content-grounding arguments. I conclude that the arguments are seldom well-justified in the sense that they are circular, and that the simplest explanation—that proprietary cognitive phenomenology does not exist or is otherwise not necessary for thought—should be defaulted to.In Chapter 4, I describe the debate on the phenomenal intentionality thesis (PIT) andarguments in favor of the PIT. Moreover, I argue that views on phenomenal intentionality entail views on cognitive phenomenology; however, given that such PIT views are not well-justified or even circular, at best, they offer no non-circular reason to endorse a positive view on cognitive phenomenology.In Chapter 5, I assert that whether one endorses strong PIT or moderate PIT comesdown to one’s views on strong CP. I also discuss the implications of the other chapters, including that the PIT and cognitive phenomenology thesis (CPT) debates are not as independent as previously suggested. I then consider that the different views may amount to introspective differences, and while some may be right and some may be wrong concerning introspecting about the nature of certain mental states, that the metaphysical relationship between cognitive or intentional states on the one hand and phenomenal states on the other hand may simply not be accessible through introspection . Such considerations do not entail that no view offers the best explanation of the relevant phenomena, and I conclude by defending the view on cognitive phenomenology that I endorse: there is no proprietary phenomenal character of thought necessary for cognition.Several of the appendices contain original artwork intended to help illustrate variousthought experiments, different views, and more. Other appendices contain derivations in modal logic intended to support the claims made about entailment relations between different views