The idea of a cognitive science

This thesis offers an exposition followed by a critique of the science of cognition. As a philosophical work the concern is with the theoretical assumptions made by philosophers of cognitive science, rather than with experimental data accumulated by researchers in the field.The exposition divides into three chapters, each devoted to a particular approach to the task of explaining intelligent behaviour. The three approaches are Computationalism, Eliminativism, and Connectionism, and the main theoretical assumptions of each are uncovered through exegesis of the work of influential advocates of the approach. The first two approaches are distinguished by their stance on the issue of the ontological status of cognitive states. Computationalists are cast as Realists about these states whilst Eliminativists are presented as Irrealists. The Connectionists are portrayed either as adopting one of these stances, or as attempting to establish a hybrid position.The first three chapters of the critique explore arguments against Realism and, in particular, the theoretical assumption of internal content bearing states, or representations. The three lines or argument prosecuted are intended to disclose, firstly, the threat of an infinite regress of representations are representation using subjects, secondly, an impossibility of a naturalistic account of the representational content of propositional attitude states and, thirdly, an impossibility of a similar account of the normative aspect of language use and reasoning. The fourth chapter of critique explores ramifications of the arguments for Realists and for those who would decline Realism but retain aspirations of a science of cognition. The last chapter of the thesis offers a refutation of the Eliminiativist version of Irrealism by undermining two assumptions required for the first of the two premises of its argument.The conclusion, that the idea of a cognitive science is a misconception, suggests that the route much philosophy of mind has taken, in the last quarter of a century, is misdirected.