Add to ORKGA pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded to a problem about luck that Alfred Mele (2005, 2006) posed for incompatibilist believers in free will and moral responsibility. They offer assistance to libertarians - at least on this front. In this paper, we assess their responses and explain why what they offer is inadequate for libertarian purposes
The consensus scientific view holds that our world is indeterministic at the micro level, but practi...
Libertarian theories of freedom and responsibility face a worry about luck: if an action is undeterm...
Rollback arguments focus on long sequences of actions with identical initial conditions in order to ...
A pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded t...
The issue of whether and how we have the control necessary for freedom and moral responsibility is c...
I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian acco...
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsib...
Philosophers often consider problems of free will and moral luck in isolation from one another, but ...
Abstract Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for th...
Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires in...
Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explan...
Peter van Inwagen famously offers a version of the luck objection to libertarianism called the ‘Roll...
If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn’t preclude ...
In this paper I will address a specific luck argument that has been put forward against event causal...
The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, i...
The consensus scientific view holds that our world is indeterministic at the micro level, but practi...
Libertarian theories of freedom and responsibility face a worry about luck: if an action is undeterm...
Rollback arguments focus on long sequences of actions with identical initial conditions in order to ...
A pair of compatibilists, John Fischer (2012: ch. 6; n.d.) and Manuel Vargas (2012) have responded t...
The issue of whether and how we have the control necessary for freedom and moral responsibility is c...
I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian acco...
The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsib...
Philosophers often consider problems of free will and moral luck in isolation from one another, but ...
Abstract Libertarians typically believe that we are morally responsible for th...
Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires in...
Perhaps the greatest impediment to a viable libertarianism is the provision of a satisfactory explan...
Peter van Inwagen famously offers a version of the luck objection to libertarianism called the ‘Roll...
If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn’t preclude ...
In this paper I will address a specific luck argument that has been put forward against event causal...
The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, i...
The consensus scientific view holds that our world is indeterministic at the micro level, but practi...
Libertarian theories of freedom and responsibility face a worry about luck: if an action is undeterm...
Rollback arguments focus on long sequences of actions with identical initial conditions in order to ...